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Results for police corruption (south africa)

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Author: Faull, Andrew

Title: Oversight agencies in South Africa and the challenge of police corruption

Summary: During the first quarter of 2011 there were a number of high-profile police scandals. These included the Public Protector’s findings that the South African Police Service’s top management interfered in a R500 million tender process; indications that Crime Intelligence officials acted improperly to hamper a Hawks investigation into Czech fugitive Radovan Krejcir; allegations of abuse and murder against the head of Crime Intelligence and members of Tactical Response Teams; evidence of increases in fatal shootings by police, police torture, and greater pay-outs for civil claims against police. This does not bode well for an organisation struggling to contest an image of widespread corruption, most powerfully symbolised by the conviction of former National Commissioner Jackie Selebi in 2010. Fortunately South Africa has several institutions responsible for holding the police to account. The questions that need to be answered are: How effective are these institutions? And how might they play a more meaningful role in reducing police corruption and promoting police professionalism in South Africa? When the interim constitution was passed in 1993 it sought to promote the establishment of a police service that would break with the unaccountable, often abusive policing of the apartheid era. Oversight of the police was made a priority in the transformation period. The apartheid-era South African Police (SAP) force had at times been ruthless in its dealings with citizens, employing both torture and gratuitous violence in the course of its often politically driven work. No longer a police ‘force’, the new ‘service’ was to be transparent and accountable. The result in subsequent years was that, in addition to the merging and internal reformation of the SAP and ten homeland police agencies, emphasis was placed on the establishment of oversight infrastructure. With all eyes focused on police reformation and the development of external oversight, the SAPS regressed in terms of internal systems of command and control. While it is no longer perceived as overly political or brutal, the police service has developed a reputation of unprofessionalism, corruption and criminality, a reputation that has damaged citizen trust in the police. Similarly, as fear about crime escalated in the late nineties, emphasis on police oversight declined. Although it is ultimately the responsibility of the SAPS to ensure the professionalism and integrity of its members, oversight bodies have an important role to play in making sure the SAPS takes action to bring this about. While South Africa has a thriving civil society sector, which includes organisations engaged with issues relating to the police, its expertise and research findings often fail to hold the attention of government bodies. As such, its potential to offer advice is not often taken advantage of by government. This paper outlines the challenge of tackling corruption in the SAPS. It then sketches the history and structure of three of South Africa’s main police oversight bodies: parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Police, the Secretariat for police, and the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), and asks how these structures have dealt with corruption in the SAPS in recent years, offering suggestions for future engagement. The paper also seeks to identify possible areas in which civil society can better support the structures in their work.

Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2011. 20p.

Source: ISS Paper 227. Internet Resource Accessed on January 26, 2012 at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/Paper227.pdf

Year: 2011

Country: South Africa

URL: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/Paper227.pdf

Shelf Number: 123775

Keywords:
Police Behavior
Police Corruption (South Africa)
Police Oversight (South Africa)
Police Professionalism

Author: Faull, Andrew

Title: Police Officials’ Perceptions of Corruption and Integrity Management at three Gauteng SAPS Stations in 2009

Summary: When asked in 2009 to qualify his perception that corruption was a serious problem pervading the South African Police Service (SAPS), a captain replied, ‘You read about it every day.’ His belief that corruption exists on a large scale throughout the organisation in which he has based his career was shared by 66 of the 77 respondents interviewed for this paper. Are these perceptions fair? What do they suggest about how members perceive the integrity of their colleagues and organisation? What impact do they have on organisational morale? What are the forces shaping these perceptions and what is being done to improve matters? This paper explores and compares the manner in which corruption, fraud and integrity management manifested within SAPS stations in 2009. It examines employee perceptions of police corruption and the causal factors that may influence the prevalence or control of corruption and integrity violations. The research was conducted at three Gauteng priority stations during the first six months of 2009 at a time when the SAPS was finalising and attempting to implement the Corruption and Fraud Prevention Plan (CFPP). Launched late in 2008, the CFPP was the first organisation-wide corruption prevention strategy developed since the closure of the Anti-Corruption Unit in 2002. It has since developed into what is called the Anti-Corruption Strategy to be launched in December 2011; post-2009 developments, however, are not discussed in this paper.

Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute of Security Studies, 2011. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 228: Accessed February 6, 2012 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&ord582=grp2&id=136169

Year: 2011

Country: South Africa

URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&ord582=grp2&id=136169

Shelf Number: 123999

Keywords:
Police Corruption (South Africa)
Police Ethics
Police Misconduct

Author: Bruce, David

Title: The Law for Sale: Endemic Corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department

Summary: This report focuses on corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD). Corruption in traffic enforcement is an issue of special concern. It is widespread and it conveys an implicit message when practised as brazenly as it is by some police officers involved in traffic enforcement, amongst them members of the JMPD. The message is that corruption is acceptable; and that it is a matter of indifference to government representatives. This undermines the credibility of the state system and of any aspirations towards advancing the rule of law. The report starts by discussing survey data from Stats SA that indicates that upwards of 150 000 drivers in Johannesburg are asked to pay bribes annually. The results of two Lead SA surveys are also discussed indicating that corruption in traffic enforcement is especially prominent in Johannesburg and thereby implicating the JMPD. The report then focuses on the experiences of drivers in Johannesburg regarding corruption. It describes what it calls ‘the JMPD routine’ – a technique for soliciting bribes that is widely used by JMPD members. JMPD corruption does not only involve the soliciting of bribes but also involves other forms of criminality that include extortion and acts of robbery that involve snatching or otherwise taking money or other possessions from people who have been stopped. Cases are also reported of JMPD members demanding sexual favours in lieu of ‘payment’. The research on which this report is based found that corruption permeates most areas of the functioning of the JMPD including licensing and the policing of informal traders. These latter JMPD functions will be the subject of future Corruption Watch reports. This report however focuses on corruption in traffic enforcement. The report concludes that the scale of the problem is of such a nature that it is possible that the majority (more than 50%) of JMPD members are involved in corruption. This means that there are unlikely to be any JMPD members who could not identify, by name, several of their colleagues who are involved in bribery; even though they may not be corrupt themselves. Although corruption is acknowledged to be a problem, leadership of the JMPD and representatives of the City of Johannesburg severely understate its scale, insisting that only a small minority of JMPD members are directly implicated in corrupt activities. Data on the small number of cases investigated by the JMPD’s Internal Affairs division is put forward as representative of the scale of the problem, despite persuasive evidence gathered by researchers and the media, as well as the experience of the Johannesburg citizenry, that JMPD corruption is rampant. When the issue of corruption is raised with JMPD leaders their response is also frequently to portray it as a problem that is created by the public. While it is true that many members of the public willingly involve themselves in corrupt transactions, it may be assumed that most people would be afraid to offer bribes if they feared that JMPD members would take action against them for doing so. However, the exact allocation of responsibility between members of the JMPD and the public for the problem of corruption is a secondary matter in this report. The key point is that it is the Johannesburg Metropolitan government and the JMPD who are responsible for maintaining law and order on the roads of Johannesburg and who thus who bear the principal responsibility for addressing corruption. The scale of corruption in fact demonstrates that there are systemic weaknesses in current responses to corruption within the JMPD. An important manifestation of these weaknesses is that although there is an internal investigative and disciplinary system, it is clearly not meeting the demands being placed on it. For example, the JMPD has up to this point never been able to answer questions about how many, if any, members who are involved in corruption have been found guilty in disciplinary proceedings and dismissed from the JMPD. The report concludes with recommendations for addressing this complex problem. However, any effort in this direction must begin by the leadership of the city and the JMPD acknowledging the scale of the problem.

Details: Parklands, South Africa: Corruption Watch, 2012. 59p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2012 at: http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/39016_corruption_watch_report_final.pdf

Year: 2012

Country: South Africa

URL: http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/39016_corruption_watch_report_final.pdf

Shelf Number: 125116

Keywords:
Bribes
Police Corruption (South Africa)
Police Misconduct
Traffic Enforcement